The environment and migration are both ‘hot topics' on the agendas of governments, policy-makers and international organizations. Since 1990, when the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) remarked that the greatest single impact of climate change could be on human migration - with millions of people displaced by shoreline erosion, coastal flooding and agricultural disruption, various analysts have tried to put numbers on future flows of climate migrations, often referred to as ‘climate refugees' - it is predicted that there will be approximately 200 million forced climate migrants in 2050. This claim was further substantiated by the findings of the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report in 2007, which provided ample indications that climate change and increasing intensity of natural hazards will raise the risk of humanitarian emergencies. While the scientific argument for climate change is largely accurate and well established, the effects of climate change for human population distribution are more ambiguous and unpredictable. With so many other social, political, economic and environmental factors at work, establishing a clear linear, causative relationship between anthropogenic climate change and migration has, been difficult; this can be attributed to the lack of research and resources spent on analyzing the impacts of climate change on the human population. Nevertheless, it is evident that both gradual and sudden environmental changes have already resulted in substantial human migration and displacement and this trend is expected to continue.

In order to discuss the debate and lay out potential international and domestic policy responses to the likelihood of large scale population movements caused by climate change, it is necessary to fully understand the debate. One of the largely contentious issues surrounding the debate is whether people displaced by climate change should be defined as ‘climate refugees' or ‘climate migrants'. Terminology is extremely significant because which definition becomes generally accepted will have very real implications for the obligations of the international community under international law.

Campaigners have long used the phrase ‘environmental refugee' or ‘climate refugee' to convey a sense of urgency to the issue of migration and climate change. They argue that such people need to ‘seek refuge' from the impacts of climate change; the word ‘refuge' tends to generate sympathy from the general public. The use of the word ‘refugee', however, to describe those feeling from environmental pressures is not precisely accurate under international law. The United Nations' 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol concerning the status of refugees are clear that the term should be restricted to those facing persecution. In addition, categorization as a refugee implies crossing an internationally recognized border; someone displaced within their own country is considered an ‘internally displaced person' (IDP). Given that the majority of people displaced by climate change will most likely still remain within their own borders, restricting the definition to those who cross international borders may seriously understate the extent of the problem. The concept of ‘refugee' also tends to imply the right of return once the persecution that triggered the original flight has ceased. This is impossible in the case of sea level rise and so the term distorts the nature of the problem. There is also the concern that expanding the definition of a refugee from political persecution to apply to those forced to flee for environmental reasons would dilute the available international mechanisms and goodwill that cater to existing refugees under the traditional definition.

Currently, there is considerable resistance among the international community to expanding or broadening the definition of a ‘refugee'. Developed countries fear that accepting the term would compel them to offer the same protections as political refugees; while many international institutions have serious reservations about changing the terminology. For example, UNHCR believes that using such terminology could potentially undermine the international legal regime for the protection of refugees whose rights and obligations are quite clearly define and understood. It could also create confusion regarding the impact of climate change, environmental degradation and migration and persecution that is at the root of a refugee fleeing a country of origin and seeking international protection. While environmental factors can contribute to promoting cross-border movements, they are not yet the grounds, for granting refugee status under international refugee law.

IOM has put forward a working definition of ‘environmental migrant', proposing that ˝Environmental migrants are persons or groups of persons who, for reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to have to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their territory of abroad." Despite this working definition, these migrants are still invisible in the international system; no institution is responsible for collecting date on their numbers, let alone providing them with basic services. Unable to provide political persecution in their country of origin they fall through the cracks in asylum law.

The migration, environment and climate change nexus is a complex one. The movement of people as a result of changes in the environment is not a new phenomenon. However, it is only in the last 20 years or so that the international community has begun to recognize the wider linkages and implications that a changing climate and environment has on human mobility. While the IPCC in 1990 recognized that ˝the greatest single impact of climate change could be on human migration" ̏ and the issue was framed within a wider security debate, momentum on the issue did not last. Only until recently did the topic of migration and the environment and its inter-linkages be seriously considered by migration experts and policy makers. This initial neglect can be largely attributed to the lack of consensus between researchers about the relationship between environmental change and migration. To this effect, the research literature on environmental migration has tended to fall into two broad categories: work done by ‘minimalists', who suggest that the environment is only a contextual factor to  migration, and work done by ‘maximalists', who claim that the environment directly causes people to be forced to move. Nevertheless, the issue has resurfaced, and experts are increasingly raising awareness of the linkages between the environment and human mobility and the importance of incorporating these issues at all levels of policy dialogue. Climate change, on its own, does not directly displace people or cause them to move, but it produces environmental effects and exacerbates preexisting vulnerabilities that make it difficult for people to survive where they are. To put the debate into perspective, the impact of climate change can be divided into two distinct drivers of migration: climate processes, such as sea-level rise, salinization of agricultural land, desertification and growing water scarcity, and climate events, such as flooding, storms and glacial lake outburst floods. Non-climate drivers, such as government policy, population growth and community-level resilience to natural disaster, are also important. These all contribute to the degree of vulnerability people experience.

The Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, Walter Kalin, has identified five climate change-related scenarios that may directly or indirectly cause human displacement: hydro-meteorological disasters (flooding, hurricanes/typhoons/cyclones, mudslides, etc..); zones designated by Governments as being too high-risk and dangerous for human habitation; environmental degradation and slow onset disaster (e.g. reduction of water availability, desertification, recurrent flooding, salinization of coastal zones, etc.); the case of ‘sinking' small island states; and violent conflict triggered by a decrease in essential resources (e.g. water, land, food) owing to climate change. Some environmental changes occur with little or no warning and require that people move quickly, while others develop more slowly and may provide time for people to assess their options, leave in an orderly manner and even bring resources with them. However, certain thresholds or ‘tipping points' may be reached, where there is little choice left but to move.

The United Nations Secretary-General has committed the UN system to be responsive to the evolution of the inter-governmental discussions on climate change, while at the same time offering proactive leadership in key emerging areas. Addressing the humanitarian consequences is a definite priority. Climate change is not just a scientific issue and more work needs to be done in analyzing the likely human displacement scenarios that climate change will cause, and to identify and fill any legal and operational gaps. In this regard, in order to better understand the likely impact of climate change, there needs to be a shift in the migration research agenda towards a stronger focus on internal migration, and more emphasis on understanding South-South migration where most migration is likely to take place; the research agenda will need to give greater priority to policy in the South. For instance, in Bangladesh, which is extremely vulnerable to serious and recurrent floods, many Bangladeshi families escaping floods and droughts slip over the Indian border and seek refuge in shanty towns. These floods are predicated to strike more severely with climate change, bringing about an increased number of peoples fleeing the floods. In addition, future research needs to be more balanced to include a greater focus on slow-onset changes in the environment, as they can have a much greater impact on the movement of people. Moreover, further measures could be taken to improve data and methods; it is difficult to persuade policy makers of the likely importance of climate change related migration without reliable figures. In addition to investing in new research, it is important to ensure that existing data sources and research findings are utilized by policy makers, especially those in developing countries who may have poor access to such information. There is a need to document, monitor and analyze policy responses to environmental migration from prevention, adaptation, resettlement to managing future flows. Furthermore, it is essential that new programs for research on migration, environment and climate change include a research capacity-building component which will enable developing countries to build up their own knowledge base.

On current climate change scenarios a certain amount of forced climate migration is ‘locked in'. But how much depends on the international community's mitigation and adaptation plans now. Domestic policy remains a key variable in disaster risk reduction and population distribution. With the right kind of adaption, countries can reduce their vulnerability to the impacts of climate events and managed the evolution of climate processes. Cuba, for example, lies directly in a hurricane path but suffers less from hurricanes than its neighbors because of careful preparation, effective early warning systems and widespread storm education. But few countries are putting any plans in place for the prospect of large-scale force climate migration.

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has supported the development of National Adaption Programmes of Action (NAPA) , which, in terms of national policy responses and adaptation, was developed to help Least Developed Countries (LDCs) identify, respond and adapt to climate change. However, as noted by the Human Development Report 2009 , the NAPAs have generally not been integrated into the Poverty Reduction Strategies that these same developing countries prepare as part of their national development plan. None of the fourteen (Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burundi, Cambodia, Comoros, Djibouti, Haiti, Kiribati, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Niger, Samoa, Senegal) submitted so far mention migration or population relocation as a possible policy response. Nevertheless, the NAPAs remain one of the few planning instruments for LDCs that are facing the prospect of large-scale dislocations due to climate change. The majority of NAPAs see the adaptation strategies they describe as ways to reduce migration pressures and allow people to remain in their original settlements. Bangladesh, for example, seeks to combat salinization, arguing that it will help reduce migration to cities for jobs and other livelihood possibilities, and help halt the ‘social consequences of mass-scale migration to cities'. Guinea Bissau proposes a project - Protection of Salt-Water rice against High-Tide Invasion - to stem migration. Other NAPA approaches focus on early warning and emergency preparedness to reduce displacement due to natural disasters associated with climate change. Tuvalu proposes a project - Strengthening Community Disaster Preparedness and Response Potential - that includes a post-disaster resettlement and rescue plan. Mozambique proposes to establish an early warning system that will help identify risk and vulnerable areas and resettle/relocate the affected populations from flood-cyclone-prone areas. In some cases, the NAPA identifies migration as an adaptation strategy in itself. This perspective appears in two contexts. First, some countries see migration as a way to reduce population pressures in place with fragile ecosystems. For example, it refers to resettlement of people as an adaptation strategy to address limited water resources and to rehabilitate mangrove areas, but there is no further discussion of the issues. Second, countries recognize that resettlement of some populations may be inevitable, given the likely trends, and should be accomplished with planning; this is more prevalent. For example, the Solomon Islands present projects focused on relocating at risk populations. One project, entitled Human Settlement, recognizes that island communities' main adaptation option is relocation. The project will enhance communities' capacity to manage the impacts of climate change and sea-level rise and plan for adaptation. While the NAPAs are valuable in assessing low-income countries' understanding of the potential ramifications of climate change for migration, they do not provide information on the ways in which middle-income countries see the connections between climate change and migration. For instance in China, India and Mexico, three of the major source countries of international migration, there is an absence of plans to address climate change and environmental hazards.

Few destination countries - destination countries being those countries to which migrants are relocating - have elaborated specific policy measures to respond to the international movements of environmental migrants. None currently have a pro-active policy to resettle those affected by environmental disasters. Most migrants would fall under already established labor migration or family reunification schemes. Other measures are generally on an ad-hoc basis usually in response to natural disasters focused on exceptions to deportation for affected persons already on the territory. Some countries have special policies allowing individuals to remain temporarily without fear of deportation in the event of natural disasters, armed conflict and other sever situations as is the case in the United States with the designation of temporary protected status (TPS). In only a few cases has there been any serious discussion of new immigration policy frameworks for those displaced by climate change; even in this context, however, the focus has been on disaster-related, not slow-onset, movement. For instance, the Green Party in Australia launched an initiative in 2007 to establish a ‘climate refugee visa' in immigration laws; the bill, however, was defeated in 2007, although the Green Party intends to reintroduce it or a similar bill. Moreover, apart from New Zealand, which has agreed to accept inhabitants of Tuvalu if and when climate change leaves their country inhabitable, no other country has yet been willing to set a precedent by explicitly accepting climate migrants under a refugee category.

Climate change will have implications on a wide range of human rights. Those which relate most directly to climate change-related impacts are: the right to life, the right to adequate food, the right to water, the right to health, the right to adequate housing and the right to self-determination. The effects of climate change will be felt most acutely by those segments of the population who are already in vulnerable situations due to factors such as poverty, gender, age, minority status and disability; these are: women, children and indigenous peoples.

In light of ‘human rights and climate change', the Human Rights Council has recognized in its resolution 7/23 ‘Human rights and climate change' (28 March 2008), expressing concern that climate change ‘poses an immediate and far-reaching threat to people and communities around the world'. In implementation of this resolution, OHCHR prepared and submitted a study on the relationship between climate change and human rights (A/HRC/10/61 ) to the 10th session of the Council. Moreover, on 25 March 2009, the Council adopted resolution 10/4 ‘Human rights and climate change' in which, it notes that ‘climate change-related impacts have a range of implications, both direct and indirect, for the effective enjoyment of human rights'.

˝Looking at the human rights implications of climate change clearly underlines why a failure to take decisive action against climate change is inexcusable. Indeed, human rights remind us that protecting individuals against the negative effects of climate change should be one of the ultimate goals of climate change negotiations." - Ms. Kyung-what Kang, United Nations Deputy High Commissioner

On the whole, measures specifically targeting migration in relation to the environment are ad hoc at best. Given the current gaps, more attention needs to be placed on identifying and testing new frameworks for managing potential movements. Attention needs to be given to both sides of the environment and migration nexus: identifying adaptation strategies that enable people to remain where they currently live and work; and identifying resettlement strategies that protect people's lives and livelihoods when they are unable to remain. Since internal migration is the most likely outcome for those affected by climate change and other environmental hazards, the highest priority should be given to policies and programs aimed at managing these issue within the most affected countries. International cooperation in mitigating migration while planning for movements as an essential component of adaptation strategies will help ensure the protection of those who will be most affected by environmental change.

Recommendations by the Human Rights Council:

·         Further research to assess how different climate change-related phenomena affect human rights and to explore in more detail how a human rights approach could strengthen polices and measures and enhance the protection of human rights in the face of climate change;

·         The application of a human rights approach in preventing and responding to the effects of climate change to empower individuals and groups;

·         Human rights standards and principles should inform and strengthen policymaking in the areas of climate change, promoting policy coherence and sustainable outcomes.

Recommendations by UNHCR in cooperation with the Norwegian Refugee Council , IOM, UNU , and the Representative of the Secretary General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons :

·         States should address and mitigate climate change by reducing green-house gases;

·         States should consider establishing alternative forms of protection for those who do not qualify as refugees but whose return is not feasible or not reasonable - they should ensure that the migration management systems provide for the needs of such persons;

·         States should continue the policy dialogue on the displacement - climate change nexus and consider appropriate coordination structures for such dialogue in the post-Kyoto regime;

·         States should build on existing international response mechanisms and ensure policy coherence between mitigation, adaptation, humanitarian responses and development;

·         States should ensure that any adaptation and risk management regime of agreed outcome covers forced displacement.

Recommendations by UNDP - international recognition of the problem should take several forms:

·         The international community needs to acknowledge formally the plight of forced climate migrants;

·         Development and adaptation policies in potential source countries of forced climate migrants need to focus on reducing people's vulnerability to climate change, moving people away from marginal areas and supporting livelihoods that are more resilient;

·         A great deal more research is needed to understand the causes and consequences of climate migration and to monitor numbers;

·         And, rather than erecting immigration barriers, the international community needs to help generate incentives to keep skilled labor in developing countries and capitalize on the benefits that fluid labor can bring.

Recommendations by IOM:

·         Additional financial assistance for the developing countries to tackle climate change induced migration of people;

·         Comprehensive and coherent early action and proactive policies;

·         An improved research agenda and environmental migration profiling carried out in conjunction with environmental impact assessment;

·         Capacity-building for governments and other relevant stakeholders;

·         Preparedness at the governmental, community and individual levels.

UNHCR 's overarching policy to tackle the effects of climate change will be reflects in three distinct areas: operations management, protection strategies and advocacy.

IOM pursues collaborative approaches, including efforts to:

·         Raise policy and public awareness of the need for concerted action to address the challenges presented by the climate change, environmental degradation and migration nexus

·         Support further research to improve the knowledge base

·         Develop policy coherence at national and international levels

·         Bolster humanitarian action with adequate resources to meet the growing challenge of climate change

·         Minimize forced displacement and facilitate the role of migration as an adaptation strategy to climate change